Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity
Nadarevic, Lena
;
Erdfelder, Edgar
DOI:
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https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-012-0251-z
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URL:
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http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758%2Fs13421-...
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Additional URL:
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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/230843270...
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Document Type:
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Article
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Year of publication:
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2013
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The title of a journal, publication series:
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Memory & Cognition
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Volume:
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41
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Issue number:
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2
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Page range:
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176-186
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Place of publication:
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Heidelberg [u.a.]
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Publishing house:
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Springer
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ISSN:
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0090-502X , 1532-5946
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Publication language:
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English
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Institution:
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School of Social Sciences > Kognitive Psychologie u. Differentielle Psychologie (Erdfelder 2002-2019)
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Subject:
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150 Psychology
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Keywords (English):
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Source memory , Memory representation , Truth , Falsity , Multinomial modeling
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Abstract:
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Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to
account for the representation of truth and falsity in human
memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both
models presume that during information processing a mental
representation of the information is stored along with a tag
indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree
on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model,
true information receives a “true” tag and false information
receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims
that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas
untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To
test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two
source memory experiments in which participants studied true
and false trivia statements from three different sources differing
in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and
50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of
the participants were informed about the source credibility
prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this
precue group showed improved source memory for both true
and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain
validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and
falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this
finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a
20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The
results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan
model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.
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| Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie. |
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