The effects of cartel damage compensations

Hunold, Matthias

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/34905
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-349058
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2013
The title of a journal, publication series:	ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume:	13-081
Place of publication:	Mannheim
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series:	Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject:	200 Religion, philosophy and theory of religion
Classification:	JEL: K21 , L41,
Keywords (English):	Competition law , cartel damage compensation , deterrence , overcharge , private enforcement , vertical relations
Abstract:	Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law.

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