The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union

König, Thomas ; Mäder, Lars

Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2014
The title of a journal, publication series: American Journal of Political Science : AJPS
Volume: 58
Issue number: 1
Page range: 246 - 263
Place of publication: Hoboken, NJ
Publishing house: Wiley
ISSN: 0092-5853 , 1540-5907
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
School of Social Sciences > Politikwissenschaft, Europäische Politik (König 2007-)
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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