Lady Justice's delay : Judicial policy bargaining and the duration of senate proceedings at the German Federal Constitutional Court


Brandenburg, Jens


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37556
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-375561
Document Type: Doctoral dissertation
Year of publication: 2014
Place of publication: Mannheim
University: Universität Mannheim
Evaluator: Gschwend, Thomas
Date of oral examination: 6 March 2015
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences- CDSS (Social Sciences)
School of Social Sciences > Politische Wissenschaft, Quantitative Sozialwissenschaftliche Methoden (Gschwend 2007-)
Subject: 300 Social sciences, sociology, anthropology
Subject headings (SWD): Deutschland / Bundesverfassungsgericht
Keywords (English): Federal Constitutional Court
Abstract: How does policy bargaining at the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) affect the duration of senate proceedings? This study offers a new theory of dynamic policy bargaining with incomplete information. A new simulation procedure is developed to derive hypotheses. New data on FCC proceedings since 1972 is collected and linked to the extended GESTA legislation database. The event history analysis shows that bargaining duration increases with preference uncertainty. The empirical impact of policy preference heterogeneity and other bargaining-related factors on the overall duration of FCC proceedings is not strong and systematic enough to clearly stand out from other causes.




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