Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation


Hyde, Susan D. ; Marinov, Nikolay



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000465
URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/internatio...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2014
The title of a journal, publication series: International Organization : IO
Volume: 68
Issue number: 2
Page range: 329-359
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass.
Publishing house: Cambridge Univ. Press
ISSN: 0020-8183 , 1531-5088
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: This article argues that when democracy is not yet institutionalized, leaders have little incentive to push for clean elections, in part because they are likely to face accusations of fraud from domestic opposition groups regardless of their true behavior. Reputable international election observers can facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of elections, thus increasing citizens’ ability to coordinate against the regime when election fraud occurs, and discrediting “sore loser” protests. Patterns of postelection protests are consistent with the argument, including that postelection protests are more likely and last longer following negative reports from international observers. International election observers help promote democracy by making postelection protest more accurate in the short term, thereby increasing incentives for leaders to hold democratic elections in the long term.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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