Communication in Committees: Who Should Listen?


Schulte, Elisabeth



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9691-9
URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11127-...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: Public Choice
Volume: 150
Issue number: 1/2
Page range: 97-117
Place of publication: Dordrecht [u.a.]
Publishing house: Springer
ISSN: 0048-5829 , 1573-7101
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > SFB 884
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: In a parsimonious model of a collective decision problem with partially conflicting interests, we show that restricting communication may enhance decision quality. If disclosed information is observed by decision makers with different preferences, individuals may strategically withhold information. In this case, a committee member’s silence arouses the other members’ suspicions. As a consequence, in case of residual uncertainty, individual votes may react less to information that is publicly observed.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




Metadata export


Citation


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item