Vanessa Carbonell argues that sacrifices of self, unlike most other
sacrifices, cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of wellbeing. For this reason, Car-
bonell considers sacrifices of self as posing a problem for the wellbeing theory of
sacrifice and for discussions about the demandingness of morality. In this paper I
take issue with Carbonell 19s claim that sacrifices of self cannot be captured as
prudential harms. First, I explain why Carbonell considers sacrifices of self par-
ticularly problematic. In order to determine whether some state of affairs is (or
would be) harmful for someone, it is necessary to assume a particular account of
welfare. In this paper, I assume the self-fulfillment account of welfare (Haybron
2008). I introduce this theory and show that it can account for the harm of sacrifices
of self.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
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