What drives rental votes? How coalitions signals facilitate strategic coalition voting

Gschwend, Thomas ; Stötzer, Lukas ; Zittlau, Steffen

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.011
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Additional URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307886579...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2016
The title of a journal, publication series: Electoral Studies
Volume: 44
Page range: 293-306
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier Science
ISSN: 0261-3794 , 1873-6890
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences- CDSS (Social Sciences)
School of Social Sciences > Politische Wissenschaft, Quantitative Sozialwissenschaftliche Methoden (Gschwend 2007-)
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: Rental voting is a coalition voting strategy, by which supporters of a senior coalition partner cast their vote for the prospective junior coalition partner to secure its representation in parliament and, hence, the formation of this coalition. We make transparent that previous research has only studied rental-voting in contexts, in which coalition signals were consistent with the rental-vote logic. Employing a qualitative identification strategy, we find evidence for rental voting only in the context with consistent coalition signals. Moreover, respondents exposed to consistent coalition signals behave similarly to voters who most likely did not receive the inconsistent coalition signals they had been exposed to.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item