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Holding individual representatives accountable : the role of electoral systems
Rudolph, Lukas
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Däubler, Thomas
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DOI:
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https://doi.org/10.1086/685378
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URL:
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http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/68537...
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Dokumenttyp:
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Zeitschriftenartikel
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2016
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Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:
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The Journal of Politics : JOP
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Band/Volume:
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78
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Heft/Issue:
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3
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Seitenbereich:
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746-762
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Ort der Veröffentlichung:
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Chicago, IL
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Verlag:
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University of Chicago Press
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ISSN:
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0022-3816 , 1468-2508
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > MZES - Arbeitsbereich B
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Fachgebiet:
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320 Politik
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Abstract:
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Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system. Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules. Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.
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 | Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie. |
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