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The role of regime type in the political economy of foreign reserve accumulation
Jäger, Kai
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DOI:
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.001
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URL:
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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
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Weitere URL:
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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302554471...
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Dokumenttyp:
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Zeitschriftenartikel
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2016
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Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:
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European Journal of Political Economy
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Band/Volume:
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44
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Seitenbereich:
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79-96
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Ort der Veröffentlichung:
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Amsterdam [u.a.]
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Verlag:
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Elsevier
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ISSN:
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0176-2680
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > MZES - Arbeitsbereich B
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Fachgebiet:
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320 Politik
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Abstract:
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Authoritarian regimes have surpassed democracies in foreign reserve accumulation since the Asian Financial Crisis. Two prominent institutionalist theories could explain this diverging trend in reserves: First, the political business cycle theory, suggesting that reserves are reduced before an election. Second, the veto player theory, implying that a high number of veto players increases the de facto independence of central bankers, who are reluctant to invest in reserves. A time-series cross-sectional analysis for up to 182 countries over the period 1990–2013 shows that democratic governments tend to reduce their reserves before elections. While veto players do not affect reserves directly, a high number of veto players tends to limit a political business cycle before an election. Elections and veto players do not have an influence in authoritarian regimes. Election cycles tend to explain why democracies have relatively fallen behind in a period of massive reserve accumulation.
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 | Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie. |
 Suche Autoren in
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Jäger, Kai
Google Scholar:
Jäger, Kai
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