Which is the greater good? A social dilemma paradigm disentangling environmentalism and cooperation


Klein, Sina A. ; Hilbig, Benjamin E. ; Heck, Daniel W.



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2017.06.001
URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317418552...
Weitere URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Dokumenttyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Erscheinungsjahr: 2017
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe: Journal of Environmental Psychology
Band/Volume: 53
Heft/Issue: 1
Seitenbereich: 40-49
Ort der Veröffentlichung: Amsterdam ; London
Verlag: Elsevier ; Academic Press
ISSN: 0272-4944
Sprache der Veröffentlichung: Englisch
Einrichtung: Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften > Kognitive Psychologie u. Differentielle Psychologie (Erdfelder 2002-2019)
Fachgebiet: 150 Psychologie
Abstract: In previous research, pro-environmental behavior (PEB) was almost exclusively aligned with in-group cooperation. However, PEB and in-group cooperation can also be mutually exclusive or directly conflict. To provide first evidence on behavior in these situations, the present work develops the Greater Good Game (GGG), a social dilemma paradigm with a selfish, a cooperative, and a pro-environmental choice option. In Study 1, the GGG and a corresponding measurement model were experimentally validated using different payoff structures. Results show that in-group cooperation is the dominant behavior in a situation of mutual exclusiveness, whereas selfish behavior becomes more dominant in a situation of conflict. Study 2 examined personality influences on choices in the GGG. High Honesty-Humility was associated with less selfishness, whereas Openness was not associated with more PEB. Results corroborate the paradigm as a valid instrument for investigating the conflict between in-group cooperation and PEB and provide first insights into personality influences.




Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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