Coalition bargaining duration in multiparty democracies


Ecker, Alejandro ; Meyer, Thomas M.



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000539
URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-jo...
Additional URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322010291...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2020
The title of a journal, publication series: British Journal of Political Science
Volume: 50
Issue number: 1
Page range: 261-280
Place of publication: Cambridge [u.a.]
Publishing house: Cambridge Univ. Press
ISSN: 0007-1234 , 1469-2112
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




+ Citation Example and Export

Ecker, Alejandro ; Meyer, Thomas M. (2020) Coalition bargaining duration in multiparty democracies. British Journal of Political Science Cambridge [u.a.] 50 1 261-280 [Article]


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item