Dynamics of International Negotiations : a Simulation of EU Intergovernmental Conferences

Saam, Nicole J. ; Thurner, Paul W. ; Arndt, Frank

URL: http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2014/5171/pd...
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2004
The title of a journal, publication series: Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung = Working papers
Volume: 78
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publishing house: MZES
ISSN: 1437-8574
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Subject: 300 Social sciences, sociology, anthropology
Abstract: Complex negotiations seem indeterminate. In constellations with many negotiation parties, each consisting of internal factions, varying internal decision rules and more or less defined organizational boundaries, bargaining over multiple issues over more than one sequence, make outcomes unpredictable. Despite providing useful abstract representations of such processes, game theory is often limited to highly stylized set-ups. Relying on the behavioral assumptions of the Zeuthen-Harsanyi process model we propose a dynamic simulation model. We explicitly take into account of preferential and informational determinants of governments' risk attitudes. We empirically confront predicted outcomes with actual negotiation outcomes, using quantitative data for the complex multi-lateral, multi-level, multi-issue negotiation system of the EU intergovernmental conference of 1996, which resulted in the Amsterdam treaty.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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