How algorithms work and play together


Schlechtinger, Michael ; Kosack, Damaris ; Paulheim, Heiko ; Fetzer, Thomas



Dokumenttyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Erscheinungsjahr: 2021
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe: Concurrences : Revue des Droits de la Concurrence
Band/Volume: 2021
Heft/Issue: 3, Article 102088
Seitenbereich: 19-23
Ort der Veröffentlichung: Paris ; New York, NY [u.a.]
Verlag: Transactive ; Institute of Competition Law
ISSN: 1773-9578 , 2116-0090
Sprache der Veröffentlichung: Englisch
Einrichtung: Fakultät für Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsmathematik > Data Science (Paulheim 2018-)
Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > Öffentliches Recht, Regulierungsrecht und Steuerrecht (Fetzer 2012-)
Fachgebiet: 340 Recht
Abstract: Pricing decisions are increasingly made by algorithms. To assess if reinforcement learning algorithms are able to reach a state of collusion autonomously and thereby may breach the cartel prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU, we have built a simplified algorithmic scenario based on a modified version of a prisoner’s dilemma where three agents play the game of rock-paper-scissors. First, we describe how the used reinforcement learning algorithms work. We then have a look at their conduct during a multitude of game rounds, concluding that eventually they all settle in an equilibrium of a specific reward rate. We observe that all three agents achieve this by developing and following specific action patterns. However, it is not clear whether the agents simply consider the likely response of the competing agents (tacit collusion) or rather knowingly substitute practical long-term cooperation for competition (concerted practice). Moreover, this observation cannot be tied to one specific move, sequence or situation symbolizing an initial concertation which then is followed by a respective subsequent conduct. One approach to account for this characteristic of algorithmic behavior could be to assume a simultaneity of concertation and conduct. Another possibility could be to omit a distinct identification of concertation and subsequent conduct and to make basic assumptions for one or the other.




Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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