The effects of intra-party democracy on party competition


Lehrer, Roni


[img] PDF
diss_final.pdf - Published

Download (1MB)

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-624170
Document Type: Doctoral dissertation
Year of publication: 2015
Place of publication: Colchester
Publishing house: University of Essex
University: University of Essex
Evaluator: Dorussen, Han
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Subject: 320 Political science
Keywords (English): intra-party politics , party competition , political representation
Abstract: Politics within parties can have major effects on what parties do and how they represent citizens. Nevertheless, there is little theoretical and empirical crosscountry research on the effects of intra-party politics on party behavior. This dissertation aims at advancing this research branch by developing a framework for analyzing the effects of intra-party democracy on party behavior. The underlying argument is that party members are policy-seeking and grant party leaders little leeway to compromise on party ideals. If a party is internally democratic, these policy-seeking members will be able to hold party leaders accountable. Hence, intra-party democracy affects what parties do. Using this argument, the dissertation’s first paper shows that internally democratic parties respond to shifts in their voters’ policy positions while in two-party systems internally undemocratic parties respond to shifts in the overall electorate (i.e., the median voter position). The second paper formalizes the argument to predict how intra-party democracy affects whether parties position close to the political center or their party members. It argues that not only the center of a party’s preferences but also its dispersion matters if a party uses some kind of limited internal democracy. Preference dispersion allows for positions closer to the center. The paper presents empirical evidence for this claim and also shows that internally democratic parties position close to their party members and internally undemocratic parties position proximate to the political center. The third paper argues that coalitions with internally democratic parties are more likely to terminate early because these parties are less likely to compromise when policy shocks (inevitably) arise. Overall, the dissertation’s findings have direct implications for party competition, institutional design, and political representation of citizens by political parties. The results suggest directions for highly promising and relevant future research.
Additional information: Verf. hier: Lehrer, Ron --- Weiterer Gutachter: Matt Golder --- Online-Ressource




Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.




Metadata export


Citation


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item