An argument for moral evidentialism


Weber, Marc Andree


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12557
URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/theo.1...
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-678954
Document Type: Article
Year of publication Online: 2024
Date: 24 September 2024
The title of a journal, publication series: Theoria
Volume: tba
Issue number: tba
Page range: 1-20
Place of publication: Oxford
Publishing house: Wiley
ISSN: 1755-2567
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Humanities > Philosophie I (Freitag 2018-)
Pre-existing license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Subject: 100 Philosophy
Individual keywords (German): Behauptung , Überzeugung , epistemische Normativität , Evidentialismus , Rechtfertigung , moralische Erkenntnistheorie
Keywords (English): assertion , belief , epistemic normativity , evidentialism , justification , moral epistemology
Abstract: Moral evidentialism is the view that one ought morally to believe only what is suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. As announced in the title, an argument for (a slightly restricted version of) this view is presented. The argument crucially relies on two specific links between belief and assertion, namely that one should not believe what one must not assert, and that one must not assert what is not suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. In both cases, the normativity involved is moral. The links are established, and it is shown how to deal with seemingly apparent counterexamples.




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