Debunking color objectivism: The anti-objectivist view of colors

Lyu, Xingyu

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URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-703049
Dokumenttyp:	Dissertation
Erscheinungsjahr:	2025
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Hochschule:	Universität Mannheim
Gutachter:	Freitag, Wolfgang
Datum der mündl. Prüfung:	2025
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Philosophische Fakultät > Philosophie I (Freitag 2018-)
Fachgebiet:	100 Philosophie
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	color objectivism , light reflection , electrodynamics
Abstract:	Colors are part of our everyday experience. But what exactly are colors? Mainstream analytical philosophy often supports color objectivism, that is, the view that colors are properties of material objects (see, e.g., Johnston 1992, Campbell 1993, Jackson 1996, Lewis 1997, Armstrong 1999, Byrne and Hilbert 2003, McLaughlin 2003, Cohen 2009, Allen 2016, Gert 2017). Color objectivism is often alleged to be supported by the phenomenon of color constancy: the colors of objects appear to be roughly the same under various illumination conditions when viewed. This suggests that colors are illumination-independent, perception-independent, intrinsic properties of the objects. However, there are two challenges. First, there is the phenomenon of color variation: under the same illumination, the monochrome surface of an object exhibits different color appearances to the same perceiver, or to different perceivers, or to perceivers from different species. This supports the view that colors are perception-dependent. Second, the color-related sciences, especially the modern physics, do not seem to support color objectivism. Theoretical physicists, who seem to be better equipped to argue for color objectivism due to their grasp of the best physical theories of both matter and light–matter interaction, when commenting on the nature of color, never mention that colors are properties of object. For instance, the theoretical physicist Richard Feynman claims that “[c]olor is a sensation, and the sensation for different colors is different in different circumstances” (2013/1963: Vol. I, Ch. 35). Accordingly, this dissertation examines whether color objectivism can meet these two challenges, aiming to establish the following main thesis: (T) The anti-objectivist view of colors: All main versions of color objectivism in their current forms are false. I classify the main versions of color objectivism into two kinds: reflectance-grounded objectivism and color-disposition-grounded objectivism. According to the former (including reflectance physicalism, microstructure physicalism, color primitivism), colors are intrinsic, reflectance-related properties of physical objects. According to the latter (including color dispositionalism, realizer functionalism and role functionalism), colors are color-disposition-related properties such that the objects having those properties are disposed to look colored to certain perceivers in the relevant viewing conditions. Reflectance-grounded objectivism is claimed to be supported by color constancy, while color-disposition-grounded objectivism is alleged to be backed by color variation. Importantly, both kinds of color objectivism are alleged to be compatible with science. Strategically, I take reflectance physicalism is as the primary target of the anti-objectivist view of colors. Reflectance physicalism applies reductionist a posteriori physicalism which employs an identity thesis. Reflectance physicalism first establishes its Color Thesis: Colors are illumination-independent, mind-independent properties of material objects. It then proposes a view of reflectance: Surface spectral reflectances (SSRs) are illumination-independent, mind-independent, intrinsic surface properties of objects, which are dispositional properties posited by science. Let’s call that the SSR Thesis. Given the equivalence of the Color Thesis and the SSR Thesis within a posteriori physicalism, colors are identical with SSRs. I argue that the SSR Thesis is false due to its conflict with science, especially electrodynamics. This implies that without examining the argument for the Color Thesis, one knows in advance that the argument is unsound. I then identify the specific mistakes in the premises of this argument, covering topics such as simultaneous color contrast, the nature of color phenomenology, externalist representationalism, whether the color–illumination distinction is perceptually given, the imaginary nature of visual depth, the color membership of black, and whether SSRs are causally efficacious as dispositional properties. Reflectance physicalism is pivotal in shaping the color debate and can be used to reject other versions of color objectivism. First, reflectance-grounded objectivism is false due to the falsity of the SSR Thesis, as the former relies on the latter. Second, the SSR Thesis’ conflict with electrodynamics suggests that color-disposition-grounded objectivism similarly conflicts with electrodynamics. Importantly, I argue that the conceptual frame of color-disposition-grounded objectivism conflicts with the boundary conditions in electrodynamics. To examine whether color objectivism meet the challenge from science, I propose that although science is not sufficient to support the scientists’ view of color, it is sufficient to reject all main versions of color objectivism in their current forms. Specifically, to respect color science, color objectivism must account for radiant energy (or the reflected light) in terms of the properties of objects in a proper way, where radiant energy represents the objective side of the correlation (established by color science) between physical stimuli and the resulting perceptions. Accordingly, color objectivism must involve the following thesis: The physical properties responsible for light reflection are intrinsic to objects. Let’s call it the Intrinsic Light Reflection Property Thesis (ILRP Thesis). I argue that this thesis conflicts with the color related sciences, especially electrodynamics. Importantly, the argument from the conceptual conflict with electrodynamics (see Section 8.3) which applies to all main versions of color objectivism, deserves special emphasis. The argument shows that the boundary conditions in electrodynamics conceptually imply that the primary physical factors responsible for light reflection are contextual and not intrinsic to objects, which conceptually conflicts with the ILRP Thesis. Thus, I conclude that all main versions of color objectivism are false because they conflict with science. This strongly suggests that color objectivism cannot adequately respond to the challenge from color phenomenology, which requires reconciling the tension between color constancy and color variation. Specifically, I argue that the support from color constancy for reflectance-grounded objectivism and the support from color variation for color-disposition-grounded objectivism are highly problematic. To sum up, the dissertation establishes the anti-objectivist view of colors by rejecting all main versions of color objectivism in their current forms. Importantly, the anti-objectivist view of colors, as a negative thesis, is typically understood as following from certain positive theses in anti-objectivist color theories, such as color subjectivism. However, in the dissertation, the anti-objectivist view of colors is established independently of any metaphysical assumptions about colors. Consequently, even if these positive theses fail, color objectivism still cannot be correct.