Which political institutions can protect democracies against executive overreach? We argue that it is not individual institutions, but the broader configuration of vertical power division---federalism, decentralization, bicameralism, constitutional courts, and rigid amendment rules---that forms a self-enforcing, multi-layered accountability structure. By fostering negotiation across branches and levels of government, these institutions operate in a complementary and compensatory manner, strengthening deliberative incentives and resisting the concentration of power within the political executive. To test this claim, we develop a Bayesian measurement model that treats vertical power division as a latent institutional configuration. Using a new publicly available dataset covering 61 democracies from 1990 to 2022, we show evidence that the vertical division of power may reduce the risk of executive aggrandizement. Our findings offer important insights into how institutional factors shape the development, decline, and resilience of democracies.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
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