Hold-up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation

Breitscheidel, Jörg

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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/1203
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-12033
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2005
The title of a journal, publication series: None
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D43 D62 L50 Q28 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Forschung und Entwicklung , Regulation , Steuer , Wertpapieremission
Abstract: We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the subsidy rate is adequate to solve hold-up problems with respect to the licensing of environmentally friendly technologies. Altogether, the announcement of the subsidy rate yields higher expected social welfare than the announcement of the tax rate or the standard emission taxation if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level.
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