Inside vs. Outside Ownership : A Political Theory of the Firm


Müller, Holger M. ; Wärneryd, Karl


URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0344.pdf
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1999
The title of a journal, publication series: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume: 99-82
Place of publication: Mannheim [u.a.]
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Wirtschaftstheorie (Kübler -2011)
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: If contracting within the firm is incomplete, managers will expend resources on trying to appropriate a share of the surplus that is generated. We show that outside ownership may alleviate the deadweight losses associated with such costly distributional conflict, even if all it does is add another level of conflict. In case managers have to be provided with incentives to make firm-specific investments, there is a tradeoff between minimizing rent-seeking costs and maximizing output. This suggests, among other things, an explanation of why some firms are organized as partnerships and others as stock corporations.
Additional information: Auch als: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; 344

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Müller, Holger M. ; Wärneryd, Karl (1999) Inside vs. Outside Ownership : A Political Theory of the Firm. Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung Mannheim [u.a.] 99-82 [Working paper]


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