Teacher quality and incentives : Theoretical and empirical effects of standards on teacher quality


Jürges, Hendrik ; Richter, Wolfram F. ; Schneider, Kerstin


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/1284
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-12840
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2005
The title of a journal, publication series: None
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des MEA (Mannheim Research Institute For the Economics of Aging) > MEA Discussion Papers
Subject: 370 Education
Classification: JEL: I28 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Deutschland , Lehrer , Qualität , Pisa <Test> , Zentrale Klassenarbeit
Abstract: Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show that it is optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benachmarking because it raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers' pay (defined in monetary terms) is not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching output is measured so that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The theory is tested using the German PISA-E data. Use is made of the fact that central exams exist in some federal states of Germany but not in all. The empirical evidence suggests that central exams have a positive effect on the quality of teaching.
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