Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers

Jehiel, Philippe ; Moldovanu, Benny

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Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1998
The title of a journal, publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504
Volume: 1243
Place of publication: Mannheim
Edition: Version October 20th
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Microeconomics and Finance (von Thadden (2004-)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: We study an auction whose outcome influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private information at the time of the auction). Explicit illustrations treat auctions of patents and takeover contests. We derive equilibria for second-price, sealed-bid auctions in which the seller sometimes keeps the object, and we point out the various effects caused by positive and negative impacts. We also study the effect of reserve prices and entry fees on the seller's revenue and on welfare.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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