Biases in Analyst Forecasts : Cognitive, Strategic, or Second-best?

Löffler, Gunter

Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 1998
The title of a journal, publication series: International Journal of Forecasting
Page range: 261-275
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier
ISSN: 0169-2070
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Graduiertenkolleg VWL/BWL
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: Financial analysts act in a complex environment, and the incentives they face may make them issue forecasts which appear to be inconsistent with rational expectations. In order to test several explanations for biases, I analyze a large sample of individual analyst earnings forecasts of German companies. The evidence supports the conjecture that biases in point estimates can be useful for communicating information about forecast precision. When analysts believe their clients misconceive the true precision of the forecast, they distort their estimates in a way which gives them a more appropriate weight in the clients' decision process. Game-theoretical models, on the other hand, which rationalize biases by arguing that they are strategic lack support from the data. Violations of forecast rationality are more likely to stem from underreaction and overconfidence, two types of bias discussed in the psychological literature. Judging from the results of simulations, however, these cognitive errors do not seem to be of major economic significance.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item