Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision - The European Case


Schüler, Martin


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/144
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-1449
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2003
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: G21 G28 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Bankenaufsicht
Abstract: This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of enforceability of compliance result in an incentive problem. A reform of the European supervisory system complemented by strengthening market discipline based on improved disclosure of both the supervisor and the banks may help to solve the European incentive problem.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Schüler, Martin (2003) Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision - The European Case. Open Access [Working paper]
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