Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees


Mihailov, Alexander ; Ullrich, Katrin


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/1525
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-15253
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2007
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: E63 E61 E58 E52 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Geldpolitik , Finanzpolitik , Sachverständiger , Selbstverwaltung , Makroökonomie , Einfluss
Keywords (English): Independence , accountability , monetary policy , fiscal policy , expert committees , institution design
Abstract: The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Mihailov, Alexander ; Ullrich, Katrin (2007) Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees. Open Access [Working paper]
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