Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?


Oechssler, Jörg ; Roider, Andreas ; Schmitz, Patrick W.


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2071
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-20715
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2008
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D8 C99 C78 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Spieltheorie , Konflikt
Keywords (English): negotiations , ultimatum game , emotions , cooling-off , cognitive abilities , behavioral biases , internet experiment
Abstract: Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Oechssler, Jörg ; Roider, Andreas ; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2008) Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? Open Access [Working paper]
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