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Looking inside a conglomerate : efficiency of internal capital allocation and managerial power within a firm
Glaser, Markus
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López de Silanes, Florencio
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Sautner, Zacharias
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URL:
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http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2313
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URN:
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-23139
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Dokumenttyp:
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Arbeitspapier
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2008
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Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:
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None
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
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MADOC-Schriftenreihe:
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Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
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Fachgebiet:
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330 Wirtschaft
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Fachklassifikation:
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JEL:
G32 G31 G14 D80 ,
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Normierte Schlagwörter (SWD):
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Kapitalallokation , Firmeninterner Handel , Kapitalmarkt , Kapitalbedarfsrechnung , Planung
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Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):
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Internal Capital Allocation , Internal Capital Markets , Power Inside the Firm , Capital Budgeting , Planning
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Abstract:
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Does more bargaining power of managers inside a firm lead to larger allocations of capital? To tackle this question, we use unique and proprietary panel data on planned and realized capital allocations inside a very large conglomerate. The firm operates worldwide, is headquartered in Europe and has 5 divisions and 22 business units. We measure bargaining power by looking at the three complementary measures of power: (i) tenure of the division CEOs, (ii) whether they have the local nationality and (iii) whether they have an engineering degree (the firm has a very strong and very long engineering tradition). We find that (ex ante) planned allocations of capital are not distorted by bargaining power. Then we study how unexpected cash windfalls at the headquarter level are distributed inside the firm. The cash windfalls result from the sale of equity holdings in other firms and are exogenous to the divisions and business units. We find that managers with more bargaining power get a larger part of the cash windfalls for their own business units. Our results suggest that bargaining power does not matter in formalized allocation processes but rather when it comes to the ad hoc distribution of unexpected cash windfalls. We show that our power variables do not proxy for ability.
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Übersetzung des Abstracts:
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Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract
(Englisch)
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Zusätzliche Informationen:
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 | Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt. |
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