Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules

Maug, Ernst ; Rydqvist, Kristian

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-25339
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2007
The title of a journal, publication series: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume: 07-35
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D72 G34 ,
Subject headings (SWD): USA , Aktionär , Wahlverhalten , Corporate Governance , Aktiengesellschaft , Hauptversammlung , Stimmrecht
Keywords (English): shareholder meeting , proposal screening , strategic voting , supermajority rule
Reviewed: yes
Abstract: We study shareholder voting on management proposals. We build on a simple model of strategic voting, provide structural estimates of its parameters, and derive testable implications. The evidence suggests that voting is strategic in the sense that shareholders take into account the information of other shareholders when making their voting decisions. We conclude that strategic voting prevents incorrect rejections of management proposals.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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