After having forbidden companies to provide financial forecasts until 1973, the SEC now encourages them to do so because of the relevance of prognosis for investors. As forecasts are inherently uncertain, there is always the risk for the companies to be suit when predictions fail. Therefore the US courts have developed safe harbors, like the bespeaks caution doctrine or corporate puffery defense which are discussed in this paper along with the fraud on the market doctrine. The jurisdiction about this topic is presented and criticized by economic and behavioral economic arguments. In the conclusion the conflict between warranting the safe harbor mainly for immaterial information while having the goal of providing relevant information to investors is addressed.
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