Banks as delegated risk managers


Hakenes, Hendrik


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2771
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27716
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2003
The title of a journal, publication series: None
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD): Bankgeschäft , Risikomanagement , Finanzintermediäre , Unternehmensberatung , Lieferantenwahl , Spieltheorie , Finanzierungstheorie
Abstract: Risk management, although of major importance in the banking industry in practice, plays only a minor role in the theory of banking. We reduce this gap by putting forward a model in which risk managers - specialists that can find out correlations between risky assets - endogenously take over typical functions of banks. They grant loans, they consult on financial questions with firms that are threatened by bankruptcy, and they sign tailor-made hedge transactions with these firms. Delegation costs are innately low if banks assume the function of risk managers in an economy. Risk management can be seen as a core competence of banks.
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