The power of ESS: an exmperimental study

Berninghaus, Siegfried ; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27897
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2003
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Evolutionary Economics : JEE
Volume: 13
Issue number: 2
Page range: 161-181
Place of publication: Berlin [u.a.]
Publishing house: Springer
ISSN: 0936-9937
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > SFB 504 (-2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C72 , C92 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung , Evolutionäre Spieltheorie , Experimentelle Spieltheorie , Gleichgewichtstheorie , Nash-Gleichgewicht
Keywords (English): Evolutionary games , ESS , incomplete information , experiment in continuous time , evolutionary stable state
Abstract: Our experimental design mimics a traditional evolutionary game framework where players are matched pairwise to play a symmetric 3x3 bimatrix game which has two Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is an evolutionary stable state, or ESS; the other is an equilibrium in dominated strategies. Our primary experimental result is the observation that the ESS becomes extremely attractive when subjects have minimal information about the payoff functions although the dominated equilibrium assures the highest equilibrium payoff. The attractiveness of the ESS is only moderate when players are completely informed about the 3x3 payoff matrix.
Additional information: Zusätzl.: Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung ; 02-20

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