Bidding against an unknown number of competitors sharing affiliated information

Vleugels, Jan

dp97_13.pdf - Published

Download (497kB)

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28983
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1997
The title of a journal, publication series: None
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D44 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Auktionstheorie , Informationsökonomie , Theorie
Abstract: In the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber, equilibrium bidding is analyzed with a stochastic number of bidders. the equilibrium strategies generalize the known expressions in a coherent way. For the equilibrium bid function of the first price auction, an interpretation involving 'marginal winning probabilities' is proposed. With ageneralized version of the linkage principle, the well-known revenue ranking theorems extend to a stochastic number of bidders. As an application, we show that the seller's generically optimal information policy regarding the number of competitors is concealing the information.
Additional information:

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

BASE: Vleugels, Jan

Google Scholar: Vleugels, Jan

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item