Bidding against an unknown number of competitors sharing affiliated information

Vleugels, Jan

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URL:	http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2898
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28983
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	1997
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: D44 ,
Subject headings (SWD):	Auktionstheorie , Informationsökonomie , Theorie
Abstract:	In the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber, equilibrium bidding is analyzed with a stochastic number of bidders. the equilibrium strategies generalize the known expressions in a coherent way. For the equilibrium bid function of the first price auction, an interpretation involving 'marginal winning probabilities' is proposed. With ageneralized version of the linkage principle, the well-known revenue ranking theorems extend to a stochastic number of bidders. As an application, we show that the seller's generically optimal information policy regarding the number of competitors is concealing the information.
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