A learning approach to auctions


Hon-Snir, Shlomit ; Monderer, Dov ; Sela, Aner


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2900
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-29008
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1997
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D83 D44 C73 C72 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Auktionstheorie , Lernen
Abstract: We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Hon-Snir, Shlomit ; Monderer, Dov ; Sela, Aner (1997) A learning approach to auctions. Open Access [Working paper]
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