Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game


Dannenberg, Astrid ; Löschel, Andreas ; Paolacci, Gabriele ; Reif, Christiane ; Tavoni, Alessandro


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/29932
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-299325
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2011
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C72 , C92 , H41 , Q54,
Subject headings (SWD): Öffentliches Gut , Spieltheorie , Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit , Koordination , Test
Keywords (English): public good , threshold uncertainty , ambiguity , experiment
Abstract: We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.

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Dannenberg, Astrid ; Löschel, Andreas ; Paolacci, Gabriele ; Reif, Christiane ; Tavoni, Alessandro (2011) Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game. Open Access Mannheim [Working paper]
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