Despite the well-developed empirical literature on local tax competition, little is known
about the actual spatial structure of inter-municipal competition. Assuming that competition
takes place only among neighbours (as in the empirical literature) is at odds with the theoretical
approaches where all jurisdictions compete simultaneously. In this paper we use a survey conducted
among mayors in the German state of Baden-Württemberg to show that the perceived
intensity of competition varies considerably between jurisdictions, and can mainly be explained
by the size and location of the jurisdiction. Based on these findings we develop a sequential
tax competition model in which city centres compete with other city centres and their own surrounding
jurisdictions. This model predicts that larger jurisdictions do not necessarily rely more
on capital taxes when they face strong competition with more distant competitors. In addition,
we discuss how the model compares to a standard simultaneous approach and show that
results from our sequential model are in line with trends in local taxation in Baden-Württemberg.
Classification: H71, H73, H77
Keywords: local tax competition, survey, intensity of competition
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Available versions of this item
Tax and the city - a theory of local tax competition and evidence from Germany. (deposited 19 Mar 2012 09:04)[currently selected]