Predation enforcement options : an evaluation using a Cournot framework


Hüschelrath, Kai ; Weigand, Jürgen


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/3082
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-30826
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2010
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: K21 L41 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Wettbewerbspolitik , Verdrängungswettbewerb , Wirkungsanalyse , Dyopol , Wohlfahrtseffekt , Theorie
Keywords (English): Competition policy , monopolisation , predation , enforcement
Abstract: The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Hüschelrath, Kai ; Weigand, Jürgen (2010) Predation enforcement options : an evaluation using a Cournot framework. Open Access [Working paper]
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