Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

URL:	http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/332.pdf
Additional URL:	https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13222/
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2010
The title of a journal, publication series:	Discussion Papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Volume:	332
Place of publication:	Bonn
Publishing house:	Universität Bonn, SFB/TR 15
Publication language:	Other
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > VWL, Angewandte Mikroökonomische Theorie (Juniorprofessur) (Goldlücke 2011-2014)
Subject:	330 Economics
Abstract:	This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.

BASE: Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian

Google Scholar: Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian

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