Bidding In Interrelated Day-Ahead Electricity Markets: Insights From An Agent-Based Simulation Model

Weidlich, Anke ; Veit, Daniel J.

Document Type: Conference or workshop publication
Year of publication: 2006
Book title: Securing Energy in Insecure Times
The title of a journal, publication series: 29th IAEE International Conference
Page range: 1-10
Conference title: 29th IAEE International Conference
Location of the conference venue: Potsdam
Date of the conference: 7 - 10 June 2006
Publisher: Erdmann, Georg
Place of publication: Bonn
Publishing house: GEE
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > Dieter-Schwarz-Stiftungslehrstuhl für ABWL, E-Business u. E-Government (Veit 2006-2013)
Subject: 330 Economics
Keywords (English): agent-based simulation , agent-based computational economics , ACE , electricity market modelling , sequential market clearing
Abstract: In this paper we present results from an agent-based simulation model of two sequentially cleared electricity markets. Agents can bid on both a day-ahead market for physical delivery contracts and a day-ahead balancing power market and learn from their achieved results. Different scenarios of the order of market clearing and pricing rules are tested and their results are compared. We show that prices are lower in both markets when the day-ahead market is cleared first. We also show that pay- as-bid leads to lower resulting prices than a uniform price mechanism.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.

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