How do executives exercise their stock options?

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/31594
Weitere URL:	http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342316
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-315943
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	2010
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Rochester, NY
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug 2006-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Fachklassifikation:	JEL: G30 , M52,
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	Stock potions , exercises , executive compensation
Abstract:	We analyze a large data set of stock option exercises for a large data set of almost 200,000 option packages for more than 16,000 US top executives and analyze their motivations for the early exercise of their stock options. We estimate a hazard model to identify the main variables that influence executives´ timing decisions and find that behavioral factors (e.g. , trends in past stock prices), institutional factors (vesting dates, grant dates, blackout periods) an inside information strongly influence the timing of stock option exercises. By contrast, we find little support for the influence of variables proposed by utility-based models.