We show that, in environments with independent private values and
transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection
problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of
the principal can gain from proposing an alternative mechanism that is incentivefeasible
with any belief that puts probability 0 on types that would strictly lose
from proposing the alternative.
We show that the solution exists in essentially any environment with finite type
spaces, and in any linear-utility environment with continuous type spaces, allowing
for arbitrary disagreement outcomes.
As an application, we consider a bilateral exchange environment (Myerson and
Satterthwaite, 1983) in which the principal is one of the traders. If the property
rights over the good are dispersed among the traders, then the principal will implement
an allocation in which she is almost surely better off than if her type is
commonly known. The optimal mechanism is a combination of a participation fee,
a buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices and, hence,
is a generalization of the posted price that would optimal if the principal's valuation
were commonly known.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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