Cartels , overcharges , Europe , fines , deterrence , damages
Abstract:
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using
a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semi-
parametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel charac-
teristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges is
analyzed. The mean and median overcharge rates are found to be 20.70
percent and 18.37 percent of the selling price and the average cartel du-
ration is 8.35 years. Certain cartel characteristics and the geographic
region of cartel operation influence the level of overcharges considerably.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the currently existing fine
level of the EU Guidelines is too low to achieve optimal deterrence.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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