Debt rule federalism: the case of Germany


Ciaglia, Sarah ; Heinemann, Friedrich


[img]
Preview
PDF
dp12067.pdf - Published

Download (203kB)

URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/32619
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-326197
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 12-067
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: H63 , H74 , H77,
Subject headings (SWD): Deutschland , Verschuldungsrestriktion , Finanzföderalismus , Länderfinanzen , Haushaltskonsolidierung
Keywords (English): Fiscal rules , debt brake , Germany , fiscal federalism
Abstract: In 2009, Germany introduced a new debt rule in its federal constitution (Grundgesetz). The socalled ‘debt brake’ prescribes a balanced budget for both the federal level and the states. However, the states have leeway regarding transposition and specification of the national requirements into their own state constitutions and budgetary laws. This analysis presents a comprehensive comparison of the 16 state provisions. We develop an indicator which quantifies the stringency of state rules (Strength of Fiscal Rule Indicator). Two results emerge: First, despite the common constitutional rule at the federal level, the analysis reveals a considerable heterogeneity across German states. Second, several highly indebted states miss the chance to make their fiscal regime more credible. This finding corresponds to the disincentives of the German federation. Due to bailout-guarantees enshrined in German federalism, German states do not have incentives to impress bond markets through particularly strict budgetary rules.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




+ Citation Example and Export

Ciaglia, Sarah ; Heinemann, Friedrich (2012) Debt rule federalism: the case of Germany. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 12-067 [Working paper]
[img]
Preview


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item