Is It Better To Say Goodbye? When Former Executives Set Executive Pay

Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik

URL:	http://www.cfr-cologne.de/download/workingpaper/cf...
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	2012
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	CFR Working Paper
Band/Volume:	12-02
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Köln
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Finanzierung (Theissen 2009-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Abstract:	In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is common practice for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. As members of the supervisory board, they are involved in setting the pay for their successors as well as for their former colleagues. We analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms and the period 1998-2007. We show that firms in which a former CEO serves as the chairman of the board of directors pay their executives significantly more. We find no difference in the compensation for the members of the supervisory board. Thus, former CEOs apparently exert their influence to increase the pay of their former colleagues and their successor, but not their own pay.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

BASE: Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik

Google Scholar: Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik

ORCID: Andres, Christian, Fernau, Erik and Theissen, Erik

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