Is It Better To Say Goodbye? When Former Executives Set Executive Pay


Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik



URL: http://www.cfr-cologne.de/download/workingpaper/cf...
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: CFR Working Paper
Volume: 12-02
Place of publication: Köln
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > ABWL u. Finanzierung (Theissen)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is common practice for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. As members of the supervisory board, they are involved in setting the pay for their successors as well as for their former colleagues. We analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms and the period 1998-2007. We show that firms in which a former CEO serves as the chairman of the board of directors pay their executives significantly more. We find no difference in the compensation for the members of the supervisory board. Thus, former CEOs apparently exert their influence to increase the pay of their former colleagues and their successor, but not their own pay.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik ORCID: 0000-0003-4460-8168 (2012) Is It Better To Say Goodbye? When Former Executives Set Executive Pay. CFR Working Paper Köln 12-02 [Working paper]


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BASE: Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik

Google Scholar: Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik

ORCID: Andres, Christian ; Fernau, Erik ; Theissen, Erik ORCID: 0000-0003-4460-8168

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