Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform


Boyer, Pierre C. ; Ponce, Jorge



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2011.07.002
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Financial Stability
Volume: 8
Issue number: 3
Page range: 206-217
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier
ISSN: 1572-3089
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Wirtschaftspolitik (Grüner)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: We analyze whether banking supervision responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a single supervisor. We find that splitting supervisory powers among different supervisors is a superior arrangement in terms of social welfare to concentrating them in a single supervisor when the capture of supervisors by bankers is a concern. This result has implications for the design of banking supervisory architecture and informs current reform efforts in this field.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.




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Boyer, Pierre C. ; Ponce, Jorge (2012) Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform. Journal of Financial Stability Amsterdam [u.a.] 8 3 206-217 [Article]


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