Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament


Bernecker, Andreas


[img]
Preview
PDF
Bernecker_13-09.pdf - Published

Download (283kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/33372
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-333729
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2013
The title of a journal, publication series: Working Paper Series
Volume: 13-09
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Finanzwissenschaft u. Wirtschaftspolitik (Janeba 2004-)
MADOC publication series: Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D72 , H11 , J45,
Keywords (English): Accountability , Political Competition , Quality of Politicians , Rent-Seeking , Absences
Abstract: Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political rent-seeking behavior? For a microanalysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information of German members of parliament (MPs) and including attendance rates in voting sessions for the first time. For the parliament elected in 2009, I show that indeed MPs who expect to face a close race in their district show significantly and relevantly lower absence rates in parliament beforehand. MPs of governing parties seem to react less to electoral competition. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the parliament elected in 2005, by several robustness checks, and also by employing an instrumental variable strategy exploiting convenient peculiarities of the German electoral system. This study is also the first to analyze how MPs elected via party lists react to different levels of electoral competition.




Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




Metadata export


Citation


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item