Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? : Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power


Heim, Sven ; Götz, Georg


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/33813
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-338135
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2013
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 13-035
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D43 , D44 , D47 , L11 , L13,
Keywords (English): Auctions , collusion , market power , energy markets , reserve power , balancing power
Abstract: We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive behavior, but can even increase them.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Heim, Sven ; Götz, Georg (2013) Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? : Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 13-035 [Working paper]
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