This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of the two basic effects
of patenting: the positive effect of temporarily mitigating competition, and the negative
effect of mandatory disclosure of a patent application. Providing empirical evidence for
the presented theoretical results we find that (i) a technological lead and the propensity
to patent are negatively related as opposed to common intuition, (ii) in industries
with imperfect appropriability in case of secrecy the extent of the technological lead is
positively associated with the propensity to patent, and that (iii) the intensity of patent
protection mitigates the competitive threat a patentee faces.
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