We find an asymmetric pass-through of European Emission Allowance (EUA)
prices to wholesale electricity prices in Germany and show that this asymmetry
has disappeared in response to a report on investigations by the competition authority.
The asymmetric pricing pattern, however, was not detected at the time of
the report, nor had it been part of the investigations. Our results therefore provide
evidence of the deterring effect of regulatory monitoring on firms which exhibit
non-competitive pricing behavior. We do not find any asymmetric pass-through of
EUA prices in recent years. Several robustness checks support our results.
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