Public Opinion and Executive Compensation


Kuhnen, Camelia M. ; Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1490
URL: http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/kuhnen...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: Management Science
Volume: 58
Issue number: 7
Page range: 1249-1272
Place of publication: Hanover, Md.
Publishing house: INFORMS
ISSN: 0025-1909 , 1526-5501
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > Banken u. Finanzierung (Juniorprofessur) (Niessen-Ruenzi -2012)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Kuhnen, Camelia M. ; Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra ORCID: 0000-0002-9493-8280 (2012) Public Opinion and Executive Compensation. Management Science Hanover, Md. 58 7 1249-1272 [Article]


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